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Pollution, Law, Science, and Damage Awards
Thomas M. Schmitz*
Water, water, everywhere, and all the boards did shrink;
Water, water, everywhere, nor any drop to drink;1
T HE CLASSIC "RIME OF THE ANCIENT MARINER" refers to mariners of
the Middle Ages adrift without wind and confronted with only salty
seawater to drink. The rime, however, may well be applicable to con-
temporary environmental pollution. Today, air and water pollution re-
semble the loathsome albatross which is constantly vexing mankind. If
they are not removed they may eventually destroy all life on the earth.
2
Environmental experts claim, for example, that Lake Erie has been
aged 15,000 years over the past 50 years.3 The Cuyahoga River, a major
tributary into Lake Erie, bisects the City of Cleveland and recently was
described in The Wall Street Journal as being ". . the oil-slicked Cuya-
hoga River, which oozes its way through the city to Lake Erie, catches
fire periodically, earning it the dubious title of being the only body of
water classified as a fire hazard." 4 More recently, twelve days was all
that was necessary for a 250,000 gallon off-shore oil leak to despoil about
50 miles of California coast line.5 A blunder of this magnitude can hardly
be passed over as the price of progress and a hazard of the trade.6 Air
pollution likewise is a flourishing side effect of contemporary society, and
the resulting economic losses are estimated to reach 11 billion dollars
annually by 1974. 7 Problems caused by thermal or heat pollution are
recognized although such problems have not yet been clearly defined.8
Not unexpected, therefore, is the current public outcry against all
environmental pollution, raising such questions as, "How far do we go
in sacrificing the pleasantness of everyone's surroundings for the short-
term economic gains of a relative few?" 9 Accordingly, promulgation of
the concept that "Polluters-Must-Pay" is long overdue. 10
*Member of the Ohio Bar; Chemical Engineer; Registered Professsional Engineer.
1 Coleridge, The Rime of the Ancient Mariner.
2 "The Dying Lake," The Wall Street Journal, Midwest Edition (Feb. 10, 1969), p. 1.
3 Ibid.
4 Id. It caught fire, burned, and did fire damage, again, in mid-June 1969 (Editor's
note).
5 "Costly Lessons in Oil Disaster," The Cleveland Plain Dealer (Feb. 9, 1969),
p. 6-AA.
6 "The Big Oil Leak," The Cleveland Plain Dealer (Feb. 17, 1969), p. 16.
7 "Federal Criteria to Curb Air Pollution," The Wall Street Journal, Midwest Edition
(Feb. 10, 1969), p. 4.
8 "Heat-Lake Erie Woe," The Cleveland Plain Dealer (May 6, 1969), p. 10-A.
9 "Oil Pollution Fears Coming True," The Cleveland Plain Dealer (Feb. 2, 1969),
p. 4-A.
10 "The Polluter-Must-Pay Concept," The Cleveland Plain Dealer (Feb. 24, 1969),
p. 10-B.
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History
Man-created environmental pollution is an ancient problem." The
first smoke abatement law was passed in 1273, and in 1307 a Royal Proc-
lamation was issued prohibiting the use of coal in furnaces. The follow-
ing year a violator of the proclamation was executed for that offense.
Even then, the seriousness of environmental pollution was firmly estab-
lished.
Early in the present century, the United States Supreme Court pro-
claimed that a wrong or injury resulting from pollution, such as that of
a stream, is not to be condoned merely because of the importance of such
operation to either the public or to the operator, and that for such a
wrong there is a remedy. 12 In 1933, the same Court declared a municipal
sewer treatment plant to be a permanent nuisance, generously granted
the complainant $500 damages, and permitted the wrongdoer to pollute
a stream undisturbed after paying his debt to society.13 Yet, the Court
commented that $500 damages was cheaper for the wrongdoer than com-
pelling him to install pollution abatement controls. Although this deci-
sion was handed down during the Depression, the Court thus had set an
extremely dangerous precedent.
Many philosophies aimed at evaluating competing interests have
evolved from the voluminous case law related to environmental pollu-
tion.14 A wide variety of circumstances surrounding individual cases and
"relevant facts" has been laboriously considered by courts, to the extent
that many of these factors have acquired the status of pseudo-defenses. 15
The "Doctrine of Convenience," for example, is a curious theory wherein
the name itself suggests an indifference to mischief created by polluters
if such pollution is inconvenient to abate.'6 Rigid theories related to
"riparian land owners" caused many jurists to adopt a "Reasonable Use
Doctrine," wherein upstream polluters are permitted to pollute water
streams unobstructed if such pollution is not "unreasonable." 17 Such
pollutions, however, invariably continue and increase, leaving the prob-
lem of abatement to a future generation.
Many courts experience considerable difficulty in resolving the
equities in view of contributions made by industry to communities, such
11 Haar, Land-Use Planning 131 (1st ed. 1959).
12 Arizona Copper Co. v. Gillespie, 230 U.S. 46, 33 S.Ct. 1004, 57 L.Ed. 1384 (1913).
13 City of Harrisonville v. W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 53 S.Ct. 602,
77 L.Ed. 1208 (1933).
14 Hofstettler v. Myers, 170 Kan. 564, 228 P.2d 522 (1951).
15 De Lahunta v. City of Waterbury, 134 Conn. 630, 59 A.2d 800 (1948).
16 Milling v. Berg, 104 S.2d 658 (Fla.App. 1958); Costas v. City of Fond Du Lac,
24 Wis.2d 409, 129 N.W.2d 217 (1964).
17 Kennedy v. Moog, Inc., 48 Misc.2d 107, 264 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1965); Parsons v. City
of Sioux Falls, 65 S.D. 145, 272 N.W. 288 (1937); Vestal v. Gulf Oil Corp., 149 Tex.
487, 235 S.W.2d 440 (1951).
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as providing employment and paying taxes.'8 For example, a steel gal-
vanizing plant expelling noxious and injurious fumes, 19 a coke plant
belching harmful gases and odors,20 a chemical plant releasing deadly
chlorine gas,21 and an aluminum smelting plant discharging corrosive
fluorides, 22 all were found to have value to the community and to pro-
vide security to the nation and, accordingly, their continued operations
and pollution aggravation were held to supersede any public policy argu-
ments for environmental health. Nominal damages, if any, were award-
ed, and injunctions were uniformly denied.23
The result of these practices, therefore, has been to perpetuate and
compound environmental pollution, to the detriment of future genera-
tions. Many polluters have blatantly adopted the callous attitude that it
is cheaper to pay claims than to control pollution, 24 and other industries




Liability for environmental pollution has been based upon a variety
of forms of actions, including negligence, nuisance, and trespass. 2 Con-
temporary law stresses wrongful conduct, with due consideration as to
whether an invasion of interest exists which is intentional, negligent or
ultra-hazardous.2 7 The great majority of recent cases, however, charac-
terize nuisance as an intentional invasion of the complainant's interests
without regard to procedural technicalities associated with trespass and
negligence.
2 8
A nuisance concept encompassing both tortious conduct and invasion
of property interests has developed, in which a distinction has emerged
between public and private nuisance. Both public and private nuisance,
18 De Blois v. Bowers, 44 F.2d 621 (D.Mass. 1930).
19 Ibid. Although declared a nuisance, an injunction was denied and plaintiffs were
awarded damages.
20 Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corporation, 236 App. Div. 37, 258 N.Y.S. (Sup. Ct.
1932).
21 Fritz v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 45 Del. 427, 75 A.2d 256 (1950).
22 Arvidson v. Reynolds Metal Co., 236 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1956), affirming 125 F.Supp.
481 (W.D. Wash. 1954).
23 De Blois v. Bowers, supra note 18.
24 Reynolds Metal Company v. Lampert, 324 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1963).
25 "Pollution," Chemical and Engineering News (Feb. 10, 1969), p. 17.
26 Schindler v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 207 Mo.App. 190, 232 S.W. 735 (Mo.App.
1921); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. American Cyanimide Co., 321 F.2d 683 (9th Cir.
1963); Reynolds Metal Company v. Martin, 337 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1964): Fluoride
fumes and particles emitted held to be both a trespass and a nuisance, under Oregon
law.
27 Haar, op. cit. supra note 11, at p. 95.
28 Prosser, Law of Torts 598 (3rd ed. 1964).
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however, require a substantial interference and not merely an incon-
venience or an offense to aesthetic senses. 29 Accordingly, a commercial
activity may diminish the value of land, but damages are not recoverable
unless such activity is a nuisance. 0
Environmental pollution constituting a nuisance may be remedied
by awarding damages; or, when damages at law are inadequate or ir-
reparable harm is threatened, equitable relief or injunction are avail-
able.31
Damages
Air and water pollution which is not readily corrected or abated is
termed a permanent nuisance.32 Individuals specifically injured by un-
controllable pollution may recover damages, measured by diminution or
depreciation in property value.3 3 Thus, an oil refinery wrongfully pol-
luting a stream created a permanent nuisance and was assessed damages
measured by the difference in market value of adjoining land imme-
diately before and immediately after the injury.34 An incinerator oper-
ated by a furniture mill caused permanent damages to neighboring prop-
erty justifying an award for depreciation in property value.35
Environmental pollution due to an unreasonable use of property,
causing substantial interference with another's interest, is termed a tem-
porary nuisance. 3 Temporary nuisances are abatable and, therefore,
should be abated. 37 A steel galvanizing plant emitting obnoxious fumes
and odors, for example, constituted a temporary nuisance and was com-
pelled to make all reasonable efforts to abate the nuisance. 38 An alumi-
num reduction plant expelling corrosive fluorides into the air was com-
29 Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Ore. 336, 198 P.2d 847 (1948): sub-
stantial interference required; Frederick v. Brown Funeral Home, 222 La. 57, 62
S.2d 100 (1952): mere inconvenience does not constitute a nuisance; Livingston v.
Davis, 243 Iowa 21, 50 N.W.2d 592 (1951): unsightly, or offending aesthetic sense, is
not a nuisance; but see, State v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St.2d 128 (1968): requiring fencing
of junkyard is valid.
30 McQuail v. Shell Oil Company, 40 D.Ch. 410, 183 A.2d 581 (1962); Bostick v.
Smoot Sand and Gravel Corp., 154 F.Supp. 744 (D.Md. 1957).
31 Purcell v. Davis, 100 Mont. 480, 50 P.2d 255 (1935); Costa v. City of Fond Du Lac,
supra note 16.
32 Roddenberry Co., Inc. v. Carter, 192 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1951).
33 City of Shawnee v. Bryant, 310 P.2d 754 (Okla. 1957); City of Harrisonville v.
Dickey Clay Mfg., supra note 13. See, Oleck, Cases on Damages, c. 24 (1962).
34 Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Seebeck, 182 Okla. 436, 78 P.2d 282 (1938); Hancock v.
Moriarity, 215 Ga. 274, 110 S.E.2d 403 (1959): prospective damages considered when
permanent nuisance devalues land.
35 Economy Furniture, Inc. v. Jirasek, 345 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. 1961).
36 Ritter v. Keokuk Electro-Metal Company, 248 Ia. 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957);
Jones v. Trawick, 75 S.2d 785 (Fla. 1954).
37 Commonwealth v. Hanzlik, 400 Pa. 134, 161 A.2d 340 (1960): the proper remedy
is to abate the pollution and not merely regulate it.
3s De Blois v. Bowers, supra note 18.
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pelled to install proper hoods and electronic precipitators despite the high
cost of installing these controls. 39 In addition to abatement, damages may
be assessed for the loss of rental value or use value of the property
affected.40 Thus, ammonia gas escaping unreasonably from an ice manu-
facturing facility was found to be a substantial interference with neigh-
boring apartments and, accordingly, damages measured by loss of rental
value were awarded. 41 Continued pollution is a renewable wrong and,
therefore, successive damages are recoverable until abated.42
Special damages proximately caused by environmental pollution are
recoverable for personal discomfort, annoyance or inconvenience, injury
to health or reasonable expenses incurred.4 3 Thus, a chemical plant emit-
ting carbon black into the atmosphere was found to be a nuisance, en-
titling the complainant to a $500 personal award of damages in addition
to compensatory damages for depreciation of his property and for re-
painting of structures.44
Punitive damages may be awarded when wrongful pollution is inten-
tionally and persistently maintained with a reckless disregard for
others.45 Intentional pollution of a stream by an oil refinery with full
knowledge thereof was held to be malicious conduct warranting liability
for punitive damages.4 6 Atmospheric pollution continued unabated de-
spite numerous complaints and, therefore, an asphalt plant was held
liable for punitive damages based on the willful disregard of surrounding
homeowners' property.47 An aluminum smelting plant which was fully
cognizant that corrosive fluorides were being expelled into the atmos-
phere further acknowledged a prevailing management view that payment
of claims was cheaper than installation of proper pollution abatement
equipment. Accordingly, treble punitive damages were assessed.48
39 Renken v. Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 226 F.Supp. 169 (D.Ore. 1963): evidence
established that proper pollution controls would greatly reduce, if not eliminate,
escape of fluorine.
40 Greer v. City of Lennox, 107 N.W.2d 337 (S.D. 1961). See, Oleck, Cases on Dam-
ages, c. 24 (1962).
41 Garber v. Rubel Corp., 160 Misc. 716, 290 N.Y.S. 632 (1936).
42 Reynolds Metal Company v. Wand, 308 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1962): the emission of
noxious fumes and gases was abatable and, therefore, successive actions permissible.
43 Parsons v. Sious Falls, supra note 17: a $5,000 award was held. to not be exces-
sive damages to a riparian landowner for discomfort and annoyance.
44 Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Johnston, 234 Miss. 432, 106 S.2d 889 (1958).
45 Newman v. Nelson, 350 F.2d 602 (10th Cir. 1965): persistent maintenance of water
pollution is a nuisance.
46 Donley v. Amerada Petroleum Corporation, 152 Kan. 518, 106 P.2d 652 (1940);
Southland Co. v. Aaron, 224 Miss. 780, 80 S.2d 823 (1955).
47 Claude v. Weaver Construction Co., 158 N.W.2d 139 (Iowa 1968).
48 Reynolds Metal Company v. Lampert, supra note 24: on cross-examination, the
plant manager commented: "It is cheaper to pay claims than it is to control fluoride
gases."
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Damages are recoverable for wrongful pollution even though injunc-
tive relief has been granted. 49 Thus, environmental pollution may be
enjoined and further proceeded against for damages at law and, there-
fore, the remedies are concurrent and not exclusive.5 0'
Equitable Relief
Equity will intervene and abate environmental pollution by injunc-
tion when such pollution is continuous and permanent, when the injury
is irreparable, or when damages are an inadequate remedy. -5 1 Mere
diminution in property value without irreparable injury, however, is an
insufficient basis for granting equitable relief.52 But equity, like relief
at law, will not interfere with or enjoin an activity which merely offends
the sentimental, psychological, aesthetic or artistic sensibilities.5 3
A court of equity will intervene and prevent harmful gases and
nauseating odors from being dispelled into the atmosphere to the detri-
ment of surrounding property owners.5 4 Hence, an oil refinery may be
enjoined from discharging nauseating gases into the air.55 Granting an
injunction against a chemical company discharging deadly chlorine gas
was held not to be an abuse of discretion when the wrongdoer would
have continued releasing chlorine unless restrained.5" Notwithstanding
substantial installation costs, an aluminum reduction plant was required
to install available pollution abatement controls or, alternatively, be en-
joined from continuing an operation which emitted excessive quantities
of corrosive fluorides into the atmosphere.5 7
When science and engineering provide methods for abating pollution,
failure to employ such methods is a basis for enjoining a manufacturing
operation. 58 An equitable decree is confined to issuing an injunction, and
the burden is upon the tortfeasor to engineer a method for abating the
pollution5 9 Although most states have enacted pollution control legis-
49 Guttinger v. Calaveras Cement Company, 160 Cal.App.2d 460, 325 P.2d 145 (1958).
50 City of Northlake v. City of Elmhurst, 41 Ill.App.2d 190, 190 N.E.2d 375 (Il.App.
1963).
51 Wilmont Homes, Inc. v. Weiler, 202 A.2d 576 (Del. 1964); Crushed Stone Co., Inc.
v. Moore, 369 P.2d 811 (Okla. 1962); Christopher v. Jones Chemicals, Inc., 41 Cal.
Rptr. 828 (Cal.App. 1964).
52 Dill v. Excel Packing Company, Inc., 183 Kan. 513, 331 P.2d 539 (1958).
53 Kennedy v. Moog, Inc., supra note 17. But see, State v. Buckley, supra n. 29.
54 Sarraillon v. Stevenson, 153 Neb. 182, 43 N.W.2d 509 (1950).
55 Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 77 S.E.2d 682 (1953); Causby v. High
Penn Oil Co., 244 N.C. 235, 93 S.E.2d 79 (1956).
56 Christopher v. Jones Chemicals, Inc., supra note 51.
57 Renken v. Harvey Aluminum, Inc., supra note 39.
58 Herring Motor Company v. Walker Company, Inc., 409 Pa. 126, 185 A.2d 565(1962).
59 Rode v. Sealtite Insulation Mfg. Corp., 3 Wis.2d 286, 88 N.W.2d 345 (1958).
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lation, administrative proceedings related therewith are not a condition
precedent to obtaining equitable injunctive relief.60
A private citizen may enjoin environmental pollution constituting
a nuisance if a special injury not common to the community 6' is suffered
by the complainant. Two or more complainants may join in a class action
to abate pollution when the property of each is similarly affected, even
though the respective properties may be separate and distinct.62 Hence,
a class action brought by six property owners joined to abate the emis-
sion of noxious fumes and smoke was not invalidated by a failure of
other members of such class to join the action.6 3 Likewise, there was not
a misjoinder of plaintiffs when 55 residents of a village sought to enjoin
the operation of four stone quarries.
64
Public Nuisances
Air and water pollution interfering with the health and well-being
of an entire community is a public nuisance for which the wrongdoer
may be subjected to criminal prosecution.6 5 Generally, municipalities
derive police power to abate environmental pollution from the State,
either through a general statutory enactment or by the charter granted
to the municipality.6 6 Accordingly, power to abate environmental pol-
lution is a portion of the police power incident to, and necessarily vested
in, municipalities by the State.
7
The law is well settled that municipalities are liable for environ-
mental pollution created and maintained by them, even though such pol-
lution may be pursuant to exercising a governmental function. 68 Thus,
60 Pottock v. Continental Can Co., Inc., 210 A.2d 295 (Del. 1965); Diercks v. Hodg-
don, 237 Ore. 186, 390 P.2d 935 (1964). But, see: Schofield v. Material Transit, Inc.,
206 A.2d 100 (Del. 1960). See also: "A Complete Guide to Pollution Control," Chem-
ical Engineering (October 14, 1968), p. 13, particularly pp. 25-49.
61 Hill v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 260 Minn. 315, 109 N.W.2d 749 (1961).
62 Griffin v. Hurt, 200 Tenn. 133, 291 S.W.2d 271 (1956).
63 Ritter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Company, supra note 36.
64 Brainin v. Great Lakes Supply Corporation, 9 Ill.App.2d 560, 133 N.E.2d 730
(1956): there was no misjoinder with respect to injunctive relief; however, there
was a misjoinder of defendants in regard to seeking damages since the four quarry
owners had no connection.
65 Donley v. Amerada Petroleum Corporation, supra note 46: persistently calling the
defendant oil company "criminals," however, was unnecessary.
66 Penn-Dixie Cement Corporation v. City of Kingsport, 189 Tenn. 450, 225 S.W.2d
270 (1949); Ballen v. Nester, 164 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. 1942).
67 Nourse v. City of Russelville, 257 Ky. 525, 78 S.W.2d 761 (1935). See also Fed-
eral Clean Air Act, wherein the Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare is em-
powered to request the Dept. cf Justice to initiate legal action when air pollution
results from operations in another state. See Civil Case No. 19274 in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Maryland.
68 56 A.L.R.2d 1415, at 1419 (Sec. 3).
Sept. 1969
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cities have been held liable for creating a nuisance by maintaining gar-
bage dumps and sewer treatment plants. 9
Municipalities, however, remain immune to liability for failure to
abate environmental pollution created or maintained by third parties.
70
The few exceptions to governmental immunity are limited to interfer-
ences with public right-of-ways or to nuisances existing on property
owned or maintained by the municipality. 71 It is conceivable that pollu-
tion of air or of a water-way may be so acute as to be an interference
with a public right-of-way.
7 2
A few jurisdictions have held that a municipality having power to
abate a nuisance must exercise such power, and this accordingly reflects
the view that a legislative mandate is imposed upon the municipality to
discharge a municipal function.73 If the duty to abate environmental
pollution is imposed by statute, a municipality may be held liable for
a negligent failure to abate, since liability is predicated on failure to
exercise a ministerial duty imposed by statute.
7 4
Municipal officers are ordinarily immune from liability for negli-
gence in carrying out "discretionary" duties as long as such duties are
carried out in good faith.75 Duties imposed by law involving less personal
judgment are classified as "ministerial," and municipal officers may be
held liable for misfeasance and nonfeasance in carrying out such duties.
76
Due consideration should be extended, therefore, to determining whether
duties imposed upon public officials to enforce anti-pollution laws are
discretionary or ministerial.
Statutes and ordinances directed against environmental pollution at
the time of their enactment encounter strict constitutional restraints,
wherein enacted laws must afford Due Process and provide Equal Pro-
tection to all citizens. 77 City ordinances, for example, have been held un-
constitutional and void on the basis of vesting unlawful discretion to
summarily abate a smoke nuisance without defining the terms and con-
69 City of Decatur v. Parham, 268 Ala. 585, 109 So.2d 692 (1959); City of Harrison-
ville v. W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., supra note 13.
70 56 A.L.R.2d 1415, at 1422 (Sec. 4); Galleher v. City of Wichita, 179 Kan. 513, 296
P.2d 1062 (1956).
71 63 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, Sec. 770 (1950); Fowler v. Board of County
Commissioners of Prince George's County, 230 Md. 504, 187 A.2d 856 (1963).
72 Ibid. § 886. A municipality may be liable when sewage is emptied into a culvert
by a third person with permission or by authority of the municipality. The mu-
nicipality will become liable if it fails to abate the nuisance after having knowledge
thereof.
73 38 Am. Jur., Municipal Corporations, Sec. 651 (1954). Compare footnotes 20, 21,
22. A municipal function is distinguished from a governmental function.
74 Ibid.
75 Nelson v. Knox, 256 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1958).
76 Whitt v. Reed, 239 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. App. 1951): imperative or ministerial duties;
Farmer v. State, 224 Miss. 96, 79 So.2d 528 (1955).
77 Ballentine v. Nester, 350 Mo. 58, 164 S.W.2d 378 (1942); People v. International
Steel Corp., 102 Cal.App.2d 935, 226 P.2d 587 (1951).
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ditions under which abatement could be effected. 8 Valid statutes and
ordinances directed at abating environmental pollution practices, there-
fore, must prescribe definite standards to guide administrative agencies
in exercising the power delegated. 79
Accordingly, due to constitutional restrictions, discretionary powers
vested in public officials are limited and duties imposed by pollution
abatement laws are primarily ministerial.80 The conclusion is apparent,
therefore, that public officials charged with the duty of abating environ-
mental pollution are susceptible to liability for neglect of their official
duties.8'
Science and Pollution Laws
An interested citizens group in Montana recently brought suit to
enjoin a paper pulp mill operation and compel the facility to "at least
conform to the state of the art." 82 Failure to utilize advanced engineer-
ing techniques is a sufficient basis for granting an injunction, and the
burden of pollution abatement costs is not a defense.8 3 The United States
Supreme Court upheld a Detroit air pollution ordinance and noted that
expenditures for pollution controls were not unreasonable.8 4 Public pol-
lution abatement laws, however, are invalid to the extent that compliance
therewith is impossible due to nonavailability of modern abatement
controls.8 5
Although pollution abatement know-how allegedly trails scientific
advancements, the fact remains that some industries install only those
pollution controls that are forced upon them by governmental agencies.8 0
Although capital expenditures for pollution controls rarely produce a
return on investments, scientific advancements continuously favor annual
financial reports. The steel industry maintains, for example, that water
pollution controls cost roughly ten percent of a one-billion dollar invest-
78 City of Kankakee v. New York Central R. Co., 387 Ill. 109, 55 N.E.2d 87 (1944).
79 Ibid., Board of Health of Weehawken Tp. v. New York Central R. Co., 4 N. J.
293, 72 A.2d 511 (1950).
80 Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 80 S.Ct. 813, 4 L.Ed.2d 852
(1960).
81 There is no doubt that there would be no immunity when neglect of duty was
willful and malicious. See Prosser, op. cit. supra note 28, at 1013-1019.
82 "Right to Clean Air," Chemical and Engineering News (Feb. 10, 1969), p. 18.Basis of suit was that the "right to clean air" is one of the unnamed rights guaran-
teed by the 9th Amendment to the United States Constitution.
83 Herring v. Walker, supra note 58; Huron Portland Cement v. Detroit, supra note
80; The Ohio Engineer (March, 1969), pp. 21-24, notes that two of the "Seven Engi-
neering Wonders of Ohio for 1968" were pollution control facilities.
84 Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, supra note 80.
85 Ibid. People v. Cunard White Star, 280 N.Y. 413, 21 N.E.2d 489 (1939): smoke
regulation law valid only to the extent that compliance therewith is possible with
modern appliances and practicable methods.
86 Note, 17 Vand. L.R. 1364, at 1365 (1964); "The Dirty Ohio," The Wall Street
Journal, Midwest Edition (March 17, 1969), p. 1.
Sept. 1969
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1969
POLLUTION, AND DAMAGE AWARDS
ment for a steelworking facility.8 7 Seldom mentioned, however, is the
fact that scientific advancements such as the oxygen process for making
steel have reduced the capital cost per ton of annual capacity to $15 per
ton as compared with $40 per ton of open hearth capacity." Thus, ex-
penditures for pollution controls may be deliberated only when placed
in the correct perspective.
Although a manufacturing facility may be conducted in accordance
with sound engineering principles, the mischief created thereby may still
be so unreasonable as to constitute a nuisance and, therefore, create
liability to a private citizen proximately injured.8 9 Hence, ammonia
escaping from a modernly equipped ice manufacturing facility, 9 and
noxious odors released from a sewer treatment plant operated under gen-
eral legislative authority and approved by competent engineers, 91 were
held liable for material injury inflicted upon neighboring property
owners.
Accordingly, a deficiency in scientific know-how may be a good de-
fense against enforcement of public pollution laws. However, a lack of
suitable pollution controls is not a defense to a nuisance action initiated
by a private citizen.
Conclusions
Environmental pollution, if not curtailed, eventually may destroy
habitability of the earth. How far do we go in sacrificing the pleasant-
ness of everyone's surroundings for the short-term economic gain of a
relative few? Environmental pollution casts a new perspective on con-
temporary nuisance law and, accordingly, advocacy of the concept that
"Polluters-Must-Pay" is long overdue.
Compensatory and punitive damages are recoverable in law for
injuries caused by environmental pollution. Equity also will intervene
and enjoin pollution practices which are continuous and permanent,
when the injury is irreparable,. or when damages are an inadequate
remedy. Legal and equitable remedies are concurrent and, therefore,
environmental pollution may be enjoined even though damages have
been assessed.
Environmental pollution interfering with the health and well-being
of an entire community is a public nuisance which may subject wrong-
doers to criminal prosecution. Municipalities possess delegated police
S7 The Wall Street Journal, op. cit. supra note 86.
88 "Kaiser Industries Loses Appeal to Sustain Patent in Steelmaking," The Wall
Street Journal, Midwest Edition (March 4, -1969), p. 4: the basis-oxygen process
patent was declared invalid, negating any royalty payments.
89 Jones v. Rumford, 64 Wash.2d 559, 392 P.2d 808 (1964).
90 Garber v. Rubel Corporation, supra note 41.
91 Ryan v. City of Emmetsburg, 232 Iowa 600, 4 N.W.2d 435 (1942).
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol18/iss3/5
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powers to abate pollution. Due to the acute increase in pollution, the
duty of municipalities to abate public nuisances is rapidly becoming im-
perative. Hence, public officials charged with a duty to enforce pollution
abatement laws are susceptible to liability for neglect of their official
duties.
Public pollution laws are invalid to the extent that compliance there-
with is impossible due to a lack of engineering know-how. Nonavail-
ability of modem abatement controls, however, is not a defense to a tort
action initiated by a private citizen. If a wrongdoer is made to pay dam-
ages, he will think twice before doing the same wrong again.
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1969
